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CONSUMER OWNERSHIP AND SHARING
The Consumer Science of Sharing:
A Discussant’s Observations
FLOYD RUDMINABSTRACT This discussant’s response to the collected articles on the consumer behavior of sharing draws on a
1983–99 record of research on the psychology of ownership and property. The major recommendations here are:
(1) that sharing be defined as the simultaneous or sequential use of an object (e.g., car), a space (e.g., living room),
or an intangible (e.g., identity) by more than one individual; (2) that sharing be better described and analyzed by
the naive phenomenology methods used by Ichheiser, Heider, and Goffman; (3) that sharing arising from shared own-
ership be distinguished from sharing arising from an owner’s prerogative to share; (4) that ownership be defined as
social and legal protection of possessions for future utility in order to allow owners, as Litwinski theorized, to have
relaxed expectations, in French, attente dans la détente; (5) that shopping and purchasing are inventory behaviors that
are distinct from, and prior to, consumers’ use of inventory; (6) that distributed inventory accessed by digitally medi-
ated sharing (e.g., Uber) be examined as alternative inventory behavior; (7) that scholarship on the “sharing economy”
better explore and exploit the literatures in the subfields of (a) ownership theory, (b) child development, (c) inventory
management, and (d ) competition theory.come to the discussant role as a psychologist with a record
of scholarship on ownership theory and the psychology
of property. My research on these topics falls into three
broad domains: (1) interdisciplinary history of ownership
(e.g., Rudmin 1985, 1986, 1990a, 1990b, 1991a, 1991c,
1996), (2) cross-cultural correlates of ownership (e.g., Rud-
min 1988, 1992a, 1992b, 1995, 1996), and (3) semantics of
ownership terms (e.g., Rudmin 1983, 1991b, 1992c, 1993,
1994a, 1994b, 1999). Within these broad topic areas, “shar-
ing” is an important aspect of owning, either as alternative
forms of shared ownership juxtaposed to private owner-
ship, or as a prerogative right that ownership allows. That
is, sharing occurs because ownership is collective in one of
many possible forms, or sharing occurs because private own-
ers decide that they want to share their property.
That juxtaposition is the essence of the ancient political
economics debate between Plato and Aristotle, both advo-
cating consumer sharing: (1) Plato (1961, 1324) arguing
in his Laws that the best society is one that enforces the
proverb “friends’ property is indeed common property” by
ensuring that “all means have been taken to eliminate ev-
erything we mean by the word ownership,” versus (2) Aris-Floyd Rudmin (floyd.rudmin@uit.no) is a professor, Psychology Department, UIT
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each is made to serve the use of all, in the spirit of the
proverb which says, ‘Friends’ goods are goods in common.’ ”
This debate about sharing can be traced across two millen-
nia (Rudmin 1988, 1991a), manifesting in our present era
as the Cold War conflict between communism and capital-
ism. That is, sharing theory was recently debated by threats
of nuclear bombs.
Sharing might best be defined as the simultaneous or se-
quential use of goods (e.g., cars, books, food, water), spaces
(e.g., living rooms, gardens, decades, websites), or intangi-
bles (e.g., experiences, beliefs, identities, heredity) by more
than one individual. If there are multiple users of a resource,
that is evidence that sharing is happening. The shared re-
sources may be moveable material resources (e.g., tools,
clothes, apples, slaves), or may be territorial resources (e.g.,
desk drawers, apartments, neighborhoods, countries), or
may be immaterial resources (e.g., languages, designs, nar-
ratives, bitcoins)., Norway’s Arctic University. The author thanks Russell Belk for his invi-
“Supply Chain and Logistics Fundamentals,” which inspired the idea that
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ing, and domains of owning are always expanding as tech-
nologies develop that create new resources that have con-
trolled access to use (Rudmin 1991b). For example, when
architectural technology allowed adding upper stories to
buildings, that commodified the space above an owned
piece of land, and those aerial spaces can now be further
commodified by dividing them into time units, now called
“time-share vacation condos.” Patents allow inventions to
be owned, copyrights allow text to be owned, and trade-
marks allow words to be owned. New digital domains of
ownership include online bank accounts, bitcoins, and vir-
tual objects in virtual worlds (Robinson 2014).
Individual ownership and norms of exclusive use, to which
sharing is juxtaposed, seem to be ubiquitous and seem to be
the default norm, I here hypothesize (1) because the Anglo-
Saxon societies dominate scholarly discourse and are also
the global extremists in valuing individualism and private
rights (Hofstede 2001), (2) because these same societies
in the 60-year post-WWII era have enjoyed exceptional
and well-distributed wealth that enables their populations
to pursue exclusive individualistic use of property (Belk
2010), (3) because anticommunist ideologies during the
Cold War deeply inculcated into the American mind a dis-
taste for all forms of collective ownership, and (4) because
scholarship arising from these cultural, economic, and ideo-
logical contexts may constrain theory by ignoring most
modes of sharing. There is also the possibility (5) that the
male voice of research reports diminished sharing because
men tend not to be sharing, as observed by Pythagoras (Rud-
min 1990a, 1994b).
Thus, exclusive, private use of possessions appears in
the literature as the normal, default mode of material rela-
tionships, such that “sharing” appears to be relatively rare
or innovative, or perhaps revolutionary. I say “appears” be-
cause in reality, I will argue, sharing is ubiquitous in our
contemporary Anglo-Saxon society and has been for centu-
ries. Sharing resources has always been the norm, and ex-
clusive use of resources has always been relatively rare. In
my own life, unshared possessions include my eyeglasses,
watch, toiletries, underwear, shoes, e-mail accounts, and
some bank accounts. But my major possessions such as
house, car, money, furniture, appliances, tools, computers,
sports equipment, books, most clothes, and art are all
shared, as are the atmosphere, roads, parks, and other pub-
lic properties that I use. Future research might survey con-
sumers to tabulate their shared and unshared goods and
resources.This content downloaded from 209.1
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Sharing is not new consumer behavior, nor is it a new topic
of scholarship. A full-text search of the multidisciplinary
literature in the JSTOR archive shows that the expression
“sharing economy” first came into vogue in the 1980s fol-
lowing Weitzman’s 1984 book The Sharing Economy: Con-
quering Stagflation, referring to economic arguments about
profit sharing with workers (e.g., Dean 1986, 127; Blanch-
ford and Oswald 1987, 3). In the 1990s, there was a differ-
ent wave of interest in the “sharing economy,” this time
focused on anthropological studies of hunting-gathering
cultures encountering modernity (e.g., Bird-David 1992;
Rival 1997, 146; 1998, 621). Then a different use of the
“sharing economy” followed from Lorna Gold’s 2004 book
The Sharing Economy: Solidarity Networks Transforming Glob-
alization, focusing on moral and spiritual considerations of
macroeconomic sharing in order to satisfy the needs of “dis-
tant strangers” (e.g., Daya and Authar 2012).
The phrase “sharing economy” first appeared in the New
York Times in 2007 in the sentence, “The internet exploded
a sharing economy with things like Wikipedia where peo-
ple are doing work that creates a lot of value, not for the
money, but just because it is their hobby” (Kummer 2007),
or perhaps as their ensnarement and exploitation, as argued
by Molesworth, Watkins, and Denegri-Knott (2016, in this
issue). Since 2007, there have been dozens of appearances
of “sharing economy” in the New York Times, including in
Friedman’s 2013 column “Welcome to the ‘Sharing Econ-
omy.’ ” Google has over 2 million hits for “sharing economy.”
Clearly, the concept and phrase have been well established
in mainstream US culture.
The current focus on microeconomic sharing in the con-
sumer behavior literature seems to have started with Belk’s
presentation in October 2006 at the University of Wiscon-
sin conference on “The Politics of Consumption / The Con-
sumption of Politics” (Shah et al. 2007). Belk’s (2007) paper
entitled, “Why Not Share Rather than Own?” was followed
by his major review paper “Sharing” (2010), which pro-
voked a research focus on “the sharing economy.” The set
of articles in this special issue arise from this recent re-
search trend.
My method as a discussant was to read the first drafts of
the manuscripts composing this special issue, and to allow
them to excite the ideas I here develop. I will not be writing
summaries or directed critical comments about each of the
articles in this issue. Nor will I try to integrate them as some
discussants do. These articles have helped me come to two
critical contributions to research on sharing: (A) there needs83.028.013 on April 08, 2016 13:13:00 PM
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scription of the contemporary consumer world; (B) there
needs to be more consideration of research literature with
historical depth and interdisciplinary breadth.
NAIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SHARING
TRANSPORTATION AND SHARING HOUSING
“Phenomenology” is a much used and often misused con-
cept. At one extreme, phenomenology entails orthodox
methods of collecting subjects’ self-report data, for example,
by questionnaires, by interviews, or by diaries (e.g., West-
brook 1983; Fennel 1985; McQuarrie and McIntyre 1990).
At another extreme, phenomenology entails often opaque
analyses deriving from Husserl, Heidegger, and other ab-
stractionists, requiring technical philosophical concepts such
as bracketing, intentionality, Dasein, and so on (e.g., Chur-
chill and Wertz 1985; Stewart 1987). The naive phenome-
nology advocated here does not require data from subjects,
does not require philosophical technicalities, does not re-
quire introspective analysis of consciousness, and does
not build on existing research literature. Rather, it is the
method practiced by Gustav Ichheiser (1943, 1949), Fritz
Heider (1958, 1983, 1987–89), and Irving Goffman (1956,
1971, 1979).
These scholars did influence one another. For example,
Goffman’s (1956, 2) first footnote in his first publicationThis content downloaded from 209.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms acknowledges Ichheiser’s influence, and Ichheiser is one
of the two most cited scholars in Heider’s 1958 book The
Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. Their method of naive
phenomenology is to observe, especially what scholars have
been overlooking, and to think about those observations,
often using mental experiments or taxonomic structures
(Rudmin et al. 1987; Rudmin 2010). Naive phenomenology
is much like participant-observation of one’s own activities,
looking at them as though they were alien and thus seeing
commonly unnoticed aspects of those activities.
Discussions of the new sharing economy often use the
examples of car sharing via the digital platform of Uber
and residence sharing via the digital platform of Airbnb.
It thus seems appropriate to here demonstrate naive phe-
nomenology by consideration of consumers’ needs (1) to
use a motor vehicle and (2) to use a vacation residence. I
live in Ontario where it is very ordinary in the summer
for a family to drive their car (owned or leased) to a cottage
(owned, borrowed, or rented). The trip will start from a pri-
vate driveway, take city streets, maybe use the provincial
Route 401 across Toronto, maybe shift to the private toll
road, Route 407, and the trip will invariably end using a
cottage association’s dirt road. In table 1, I have listed many
of the ways to have the use of motor vehicle transport, and
many of the ways to have use of a road on which to operate
a motor vehicle. In table 2, I have listed many of the ways toTable 1. Some Ways to Use a Motor Vehicle and Roadways
Ways to Use a Motor Vehicle Ways to Use Roadways
A. Use of vehicle only A. Privately owned roadways
1. Individually owned car 1. Private driveway or roadway
2. Leased car 2. Shared driveway or roadway
3. Rented car 3. Deeded right of way
4. Car-share membership car 4. Gated community roadway
5. Family car 5. Corporate driveway or parking lot
6. Company or employer’s car 6. Commercial toll road
7. Borrowed car, with permission B. Publicly owned roadways
8. Borrowed car, without permission 7. Municipal roadway
9. Stolen car 8. County roadway
B. Use of vehicle with a driver 9. State roadway




14. Municipal bus ride
15. Commercial bus ride83.02
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frommy own naive observations of life around me. Readers
might notice other options to add to these lists.
Consumer behavior research rarely, if ever, has observed
that consumers use roadways. For example, Rose and Nei-
dermeyer (1999) discussed competition on shared high-
ways resulting in “road rage.” Because all land on planet
Earth is owned, then all roadways are owned and any the-
ories of vehicle use must include consideration of road-
way ownership and sharing. This observation can be gener-
alized. Consumers are physical beings, located in physical
space, as are the objects we use, like cars, Cokes, clothes,
and cottages. Thus, consumer behavior might be consid-
ered to be a subfield of human geography because consumer
goods and consumer activities are usually constrained by
physical space and its ownership. The dream worlds of tra-
ditional societies and the virtual worlds of modern societies
do require, respectively, functional brains or functioning
computers, both of which exist in physical space. Commonly,
consumers use and store their consumer goods in terri-
tories, buildings, rooms, and containers that demark own-
ership and secure those goods as property (Rudmin 1990b).
Even homeless people have their shopping carts and tem-
porarily privatized public spaces (Hill and Stamey 1990;
Hill 1991).
Immaterial resources, such as ideas, beliefs, music, gods,
dreams, names, nationalities, histories, and so on, are not
located in physical space, but they may be defined in dimen-
sional spaces that may be delimited, marked, secured by
controlled access and thus owned (e.g., Chatwin 1998; Gra-
ham 2013). The possession and ownership of immaterial
resources have a long history of discussion (e.g., Cooley
1902; Allport 1937; Litwinski 1942, 1947a, 1950, 1953;This content downloaded from 209.1
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search might review and elaborate these theories to incor-
porate shared possession and shared dispossession of im-
material resources, and to bring these theories up to date
to include digitally defined immaterial resources.
Table 1 needs some explanation. First, notice that only
the first two, “1. Individually owned car” and “1. Private
driveway or roadway,” can be used exclusively by an indi-
vidual owner, that is, can be “not shared.” All of the other
options are unavoidably “shared,” and these first two can
also be shared if the owners wish. Thus, use of motor vehi-
cles is primarily a shared consumer behavior, and it has
been like that long before the sharing economy concept
came into vogue. Second, notice that the only options in
table 1 that contemporary scholarship on the sharing econ-
omy might bring focus on are “4. Car-share membership
car” and “11. Uber ride.” Those two options (a) are relatively
new, (b) rely on digital communications (e.g., smart phones),
and (c) appeal primarily to a similar demographic who are
relatively young, who are comfortable with digital commu-
nications, who have low or modest incomes, and who might
have ecological or anticonsumerist attitudes (Bardhi and
Eckhardt 2012). Future research might elaborate the sim-
ilarities and differences between these new modes of car
sharing and the long existing modes of car sharing.
Third, notice the two modes of unauthorized motor
vehicle use, namely “8. Borrowed car, without permission”
and “9. Stolen car.” Neither of these was considered by
Eckhardt and Bardhi (2016) in this issue. Most owners
of the car would experience both of these as theft of the
car. But these can be differentiated. In Mark Twain’s novel
Huckleberry Finn, Huck is impoverished but has need for
watercraft to move about on the Mississippi River. HeTable 2. Some Ways to Use a Vacation Residence
Ways to Use a Private Residence Ways to Use a Commercial Residence
1. Privately owned cottage 12. Hotel room rental
2. Family cottage 13. Apartment rental
3. Rented cottage 14. Bed and breakfast
4. Condominium cottage 15. Public park cottage rental
5. Time-share cottage
6. Cottage or trailer on leased lot
7. Borrowed cottage, with permission
8. House swap cottage
9. Airbnb
10. Couchsurfing
11. Borrowed cottage, without permission83.028
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rafts, but often he has to “borrow” secured boats without
permission of the owners. He and his Pap reason that such
“borrowing” is different from stealing: “it warn’t no harm
to borrow things if you was meaning to pay them back
some time” (Clemens 1884, 45). Similarly, when I was
studying the semantics of ownership in a Cree village on
Hudson Bay, one elder said, “If someone takes that canoe
out there, I wouldn’t mind as long as they brought it back”
(Rudmin 1994a, 126). This may reflect the finding that
“need” is a stronger criterion of ownership rights in Cree
language semantics than it is in English semantics (Rud-
min 1994a). Gollnhofer, Hellwig, and Morhart (2016, in
this issue) also found need to be a rightful claim to food
in the context of German food sharing.
Fourth, notice that sequential sharing of a motor vehicle
with other users at different times can be distinguished
from simultaneous sharing with other users at the same
time. For example, my family members sequentially share
my car at different times during the day, but for any one
trip, we can take other passengers and thus share the car
simultaneously with other passengers. Future research might
examine to what degree consumers differentiate sequen-
tial sharing from simultaneous sharing.
Fifth, notice the need to differentiate compensated shar-
ing, usually as a monetary user fee as happens in car rent-
als, bus rides, taxi rides, or Uber rides, from uncompen-
sated sharing, as happens in family sharing, hitchhiking,
and carpooling. There may be further need to differentiate
compensation to share operating costs compared to com-
pensation to cover operating costs plus labor and profits.
For example, in carpooling, riders may pay the driver a fair
share of gas money, but with taxi rides and Uber rides, the
payment covers fuel but also covers car purchase, licensing
and insurance, maintenance, and the drivers’ time. Future
research might examine to what degree consumers conceive
compensated sharing to be sharing, if at all.
Sixth, notice that juxtaposed with “private” ownership is
“shared” ownership, and probably the most common form
of shared ownership is public ownership. Some consumers,
especially men, experience a sense of ownership over public
property (Rudmin 1994b). All “public” property and con-
sumer services, such as fire departments, water utilities,
sewers, libraries, hospitals, schools, roads, parks, beaches,
and so on, are shared by consumers because their owner-
ship is shared via a government representing those consum-
ers. In American history, Benjamin Franklin’s reputation
rests in part on his innovative promotion of a “sharingThis content downloaded from 209.1
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ample, he demonstrated that private book ownership could
be replaced by subscription libraries and public libraries,
that private or sectarian hospitals could be replaced by
public hospitals, that private guards and night watchmen
could be replaced by municipal police, that commercial fire
protection companies could be replaced by volunteer fire
departments, and that sectarian religious universities could
be replaced by public universities (Mumford 2002). Many
Americans would cringe at the thought that Benjamin
Franklin was a kind of communist. Future research might
more fully document traditions and developments of con-
sumer sharing in US history.
This discussion arising from observing different ways of
motor transport sharing can be done for different ways of
having use of a vacation residence, as listed in table 2.
Again, notice that only “Privately owned cottage” can be
“not shared.” But to my knowledge, most cottage owners
share their cottages with family and friends. We humans
are social beings and typically find pleasure in being with
others. It may be that the very purpose of owning a cottage
is to share it, much as Aristotle had theorized. Future re-
search might survey cottage owners to measure their shar-
ing motivations and their sharing behaviors.
All but one of the options in table 2 involve sequential
and simultaneous sharing. Also, notice that the ownership
of the dwelling can be separated from the ownership of the
land on which the dwelling sits, as is common in trailer
parks and campgrounds. The dwellings may be private, but
the land may be shared via user fees, leases, or condomin-
ium contracts. In sum, a simple listing of alternative ways
to have use of cars and cottages shows that consumer expe-
rience with cars and cottages is primarily as shared con-
sumption. It is not a new development or revolution that
we have a sharing economy in cars and cottages.NAIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
HOUSEHOLD SHARING
If this analysis were generalized from cars and cottages to
all consumer behavior, then observations of sharing might
be sought in other domains. Consider the children in the
family trip to the cottage. Children have ownership of very
little, if anything. For the first two decades of our lives,
most of us have no legal ownership of the objects, consum-
ables, and spaces that we use. The family household is a
form of a sharing economy between spouses but is exclu-
sively so for their children. Belk (2010) considers sharing83.028.013 on April 08, 2016 13:13:00 PM
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paradox that we all learn our consumer behavior while be-
ing the beneficiaries of sharing in a household economy,
but we come away believing that the norm of consumer be-
havior is exclusive use of privately owned resources.
This paradox might be explained by evidence that the
family household displays nonlegal forms of ownership by
which children learn the behaviors, attitudes, and emotions
by which to become owners. Leon Litwinski is one of the
most prolific scholars on the psychology of ownership (Rud-
min 1990b, 1991c; Rudmin, Belk, and Furby 1987). He de-
fined three different kinds of material relationships: occu-
pancy, possession, and ownership (Litwinski 1913, 1942,
1947a, 1947b). Occupancy is the temporary and often co-
incidental having or use of a resource. Possession is the in-
tentional conservation of a resource with expectation of fu-
ture utility for the self. Ownership is possession that has
been secured by social approbation or by the sanction of
law. Ownership allows relaxed expectation. In this issue,
Hill, Cunningham, and Gentleman (2016) document how
the total institution of the prison permits only minimal pos-
sessions and those never with the surety of ownership, con-
sidering the arbitrariness of prison administration. Relaxed
expectation is absent in prisons.
Possession and ownership demand cognitive and emo-
tional effort, though this is much reduced by ownership
norms when other people and the juridical state confirm
and protect an owner’s possessions. In 1942, Litwinski noted
that the then consumer revolution of disposable goods re-
duced the mental demands of ownership:
Possession creates cares, burdens, risks. The Ameri-
cans who lead the way in material progress try to sim-
plify the existence of civilized man by ridding him of
certain of the anxieties of the possessor. In seeking a
new formula for this, one no longer gives oneself the
trouble of sending handkerchiefs to the laundry: they
are immediately replaced. It is more economical and
at the same time simpler. It is a notable example of
progress. Not to possess too much will one day be the
criterion of progress, of independence and of liberty.
(Litwinski 1942, 31)
Future research might examine the correlations between
participation in “the sharing economy” and consumers’
motivations to reduce the mental demands of maintaining
an inventory of consumer goods or motivations to engage
forms of voluntary simplicity (Rudmin and Kilbourne 1996).This content downloaded from 209.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms To better understand Litwinski’s differentiation of occu-
pancy, possession, and ownership, consider the illustrative
example of a child finding a stick in the park and playing
with it. If this is a coincidental and brief activity, that is oc-
cupation of the stick. If the child modifies it, expects to play
with it tomorrow, hides it in a bush, and maybe worries
about it at night, that is possession of the stick. If other
children and the adults all acknowledge that it is his or
her stick and will defend the child’s possession, that is
ownership of the stick. The child will then not have to hide
the stick or worry about it. If others ask permission to use
the stick, that is evidence they acknowledge ownership. The
owner has the recognized right to share the stick, or not.
If a friend says, “Now it is my turn to have the stick,” that
is a declaration that the stick is shared property, not pri-
vate property, and the new co-owner is asserting an own-
er’s right to use.
Future research might examine how children learn oc-
cupancy, possession, and ownership as well as norms of
sharing, in the ordinary routines of the household. For ex-
ample, family meals usually have “owned” seating, with ev-
eryone having their routine and rightful place. In some
families, or for some special meals, food is ritually distrib-
uted by the head of household, who thereby enacts owner-
ship of the food and the owner’s right to share it (Wallen-
dorf and Arnould 1991). Food that is distributed from a
serving dish to a child’s dinner plate becomes the private
property of the child. Others may not take it without per-
mission, and the child may modify it to his or her liking.
Furthermore, the child may leave the table with expecta-
tion that the food will still be there when he or she returns,
if the absence is not too long. Litwinski (1942, 32) ex-
plained that ownership “is often rewarded by a feeling of
detachment equivalent to indifference,” which can become
excessive, resulting in “the destruction of possessiveness, in
consequence of its indifference.”
In most households, children “own” their toys and their
storage areas, perhaps their private bedrooms. “Own” here
means that others in the family respect possessive attach-
ment to these and seek permission before having shared
use. Many sibling quarrels revolve around perceptions of
violated ownership, and parents must sometimes adjudi-
cate these disputes (e.g., Hay and Ross 1982; Ross 1990;
Hay 2006). In my own upbringing, in a family of six chil-
dren, our mother enforced a rule of property abandonment:
any toys, books, or other possessions that she picked up
while cleaning would be placed in “the bin,” and those pos-
sessions, abandoned through indifference, could be claimed83.028.013 on April 08, 2016 13:13:00 PM
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ing in the bin. Thus, sophisticated property theory was
not articulated to the children, but we nevertheless learned
something of Litwinski’s theory that ownership allows re-
laxed possession but that excessive relaxation becomes in-
difference, which becomes dispossession.
There is a large research literature on the development
of ownership and sharing among toddlers, preschoolers,
and young children. This seems to have begun around
1960 with seminal studies by Handlon and Gross (1959),
Fischer (1963), and Doland and Adelberg (1967). Psych-
INFO indexes 171 studies from 1950 to 2015 found by
searching <(toddlers OR preschooler* OR kindergarten
OR nursery OR daycare) AND sharing> in the title, ab-
stract, or key-concepts fields. Several of the most recent
studies are provocative. For example, Chernyak and Kush-
nir (2013) demonstrated that children share more from
their own resources if they have prior experience of choice
about sharing. Ulber, Hamann, and Tomasell (2015) dem-
onstrated that toddlers share resources by ownership cues
and by principles of equity, much as Gollnhofer et al. (2016,
in this issue) discovered for food sharing in Germany. Liu
et al. (2016) demonstrated that sharing by Chinese chil-
dren increases as age progresses from 3 to 11, and that
greater inhibitory self-control predicts greater sharing.
Furthermore, studies of children’s development of “al-
truism” and “prosocial behavior” often operationalize these
concepts with measures of sharing. For example, Ma and
Chan (2014) measured high school students’ altruism by
their readiness to share knowledge, and Ibbotson (2014)
presented a meta-analysis of 14 studies that used sharing
as the measure of prosocial behavior in children. Berndt
(1981) discovered that boys shared less with friends than
with acquaintances, possibly because they are competitive
with their friends. Considering that all adult sharing behav-
ior will arise through developmental processes, it seems im-
portant that scholarship on consumer sharing include deep
and current reviews of the child developmental literature.
POSSESSIONS AS INVENTORY; SHARING AS
SUPPLY CHAIN DEMAND
Litwinski’s theory of property also leads to a line of specu-
lation: if possessions are inventory for future use by the
possessor, then consumers’ acquisitions of possessions by
shopping are forms of inventory management. Consumer
goods can be possessed by shoplifting (Cox, Cox, and Mos-
chis 1990), but purchasing themwill bestow well-recognized
ownership (Rudmin and Berry 1987; Rudmin 1994a, 1994b),This content downloaded from 209.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms which ensures that the inventory is secure. Furthermore, if
sharing is one of the uses that property can be put to, then
expectations of sharing may enter into the shopping deci-
sion processes.
Inventory and supply chain management is an applied
science discipline, with a rich taxonomy, well-developed
theories, a wide research literature, and advanced computa-
tional methods, all of it far too extensive to elaborate here.
However, even basic, introductory texts describe the core
concepts and processes by which businesses acquire and
maintain inventory (see Silver, Pyke, and Peterson 1998;
Ballou 2003; Cachon and Terwiesch 2011; Chopra and
Meindl 2012). If expressed in the vocabulary of the house-
hold consumer, and if “cost” includes not just money but
human costs of damaged expectations, lost opportunities,
ugly emotions, and so on, then the central processes of con-
sumer supply chain management are (1) forecasting how
much will be consumed, or how frequently an object will be
used, and in what time period, (2) estimating the error in
the forecast, (3) finding optimal balance between household
storage costs and shopping costs in order to estimate the
optimal amount to purchase, (4) finding optimal balance be-
tween storage costs and the aggravation costs of not having
something available when it is wanted, (5) deciding what is
the acceptable risk of not having something available when
it is wanted, giving consideration to errors in forecasting,
and (6) deciding with what frequency to do the shopping.
It is here hypothesized that ordinary consumers engage
such processes, without the overtly articulated reasoning or
computational considerations employed in businesses. Con-
sumers may unconsciously, or in their heuristics and hab-
its, be imagining their use frequency of consumer goods, es-
timating the various costs, calculating the trade-offs, and
establishing decision policies about risks of shortages. For
example, people with backgrounds of poverty and scarcity,
or those with morbid fears of not being good parents, or
good partners, or good hosts, may appear irrational in their
excessive shopping and purchasing, but may merely be
misforecasting demand or misestimating variability in their
demand forecast, or may have a policy of low risk of stock-
ing out. Their inventory behaviors may be rational given
their estimates and policies. Consumers and businesses
do sometimes shop in the same settings, buying the same
types and quantities of goods, for example in Costco and
in Staples, so it is not unreasonable that they might employ
similar purchase and inventory decision processes. With in-
stitutions like Airbnb and Uber, consumers are using their
personal consumer resources as business resources. Thus,83.028.013 on April 08, 2016 13:13:00 PM
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inventory can break down.
This hypothesis that consumers act like supply chainman-
agers might be tested by surveying graduate students in sup-
ply chain management courses, asking for examples of their
personal consumer habits being similar to formalized busi-
ness practices. Another approach would be to employ experi-
mental advertising, to determine whether inducing consum-
ers to think of supply chain parameters can influence their
purchase decisions. For example, an experimental ad might
promote the small storage space of a product, thereby induc-
ing consumers to estimate lower holding costs, which should
increase the purchase quantity and decrease the shopping
frequency. Future research might also develop psychomet-
ric scales and subscales of consumer inventory style.
This line of thought has several possibilities of explana-
tory force on the topic of sharing. First, it is possible that
sharing is being forecast by consumers, as elevated demand
forecast, or as greater error in demand forecast, or as a cost
of stocking out if sharing cannot be done. For example, in
my household of two adults, we have five snow shovels, in
part, because neighbors sometimes want to borrow a snow
shovel, and we want to be able to lend. The holding cost of
extra snow shovels is minimal since we have a garage with
storage area for winter stuff up in the rafters. But the cost
of not having a snow shovel to lend is to be unneighborly.
In this case, forecasting the need for snow shovels has large
error because severity of snow storms is unpredictable, neigh-
bors are changing, and neighbors’ personal snow shovel pur-
chasing policies are unknown. Such forecasting error requires
surplus snow shovels, if we are to have minimal risk of run-
ning out of snow shovels. However, as we approach old age
and dependency on our adult children, then the cost of house-
hold inventory increases in the form of anticipated nuisance
for our adult children to get rid of our inventory. That cost
will eventually weigh against our inventory of five shovels.
In a field research study, Wallendorf, Belk, and Heisley
(1988) encountered a man who had two double garages,
both full of assorted consumer inventory because, he ex-
plained, if someone needed something, he wanted to have
it to lend to them. That is, his forecast error included not
knowing what items might be needed to be shared, and
his risk level of not having inventory was low; hence, he
maintained excessive inventory despite the holding costs
of having to forego garage parking space for his vehicles.
The supply chain management theory of consumer be-
havior, however, might have greatest utility in explainingThis content downloaded from 209.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms the new forms of digitally mediated sharing. Consider cars.
Purchasing and maintaining a car in an urban setting has
monetary costs but also cognitive and stress costs. There
are irregularly scheduled activities that must not be missed,
such as license renewals, insurance payments, maintenance
services, and so on, all of which impose cognitive demands.
There are anxiety costs of worry about collisions, break-ins,
thefts, parking tickets, and so on. There are social costs of
friends and relatives wanting to have rides or to borrow the
car, and being angry if denied. In supply chain theory, these
are all “holding costs,” costs of keeping the inventory of an
owned car, although Sun, Supangkat, and Balasubramanian
(2016, in this issue) consider these to be “inconvenience
costs.” If such costs are high, that weighs toward low inven-
tory, which in this case means low access to a car ride; in
other words, not owning a personal car. If a person’s fore-
cast demand of car use is relatively low, or if the speed of
access to a car-share vehicle or to an Uber ride approaches
that of an owned car, or if the consumer can accept a higher
risk of “stock outs” precluding immediate access to a car
ride, then it is rational in supply chain theory to not keep
the inventory of an owned car. It is access to car transport
that is consumed; an owned car is merely the inventory ob-
ject that allows such access (Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012;
Eckhardt and Bardhi 2016). This ignores ego investment
in automobiles for some people, although this could per-
haps also be subsumed within inventory theory. Habibi,
Kim, and Laroche (2016, in this issue) describe the risk
of “stock outs” as “scarcity risk.” Future research might
study car-share members and Uber users to see if any sup-
ply chain parameters enter their decisions to forgo car own-
ership. Future research might also use inventory theory to
explain why Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, and George Soros do
not participate in the sharing economy as Uber drivers or
Uber customers, or as Airbnb hosts or guests.
SHARING AS COMPETITION
Often unnoticed in the literature on sharing is that more
than one user of an object or a space causes there to be com-
petition between users. For simultaneous sharing, within
the physical world, this is often a zero-sum competition.
That is, if I am in the shower, my siblings cannot be in
the shower, and if I have the preferred seat in the car, my
siblings cannot have the preferred seat in the car. In Amer-
ican slang, to “call dibs” is a claim in a zero-sum sharing con-
text to have priority use, or temporary ownership, of the
coveted space or position. To call dibs means that the caller83.028.013 on April 08, 2016 13:13:00 PM
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tition for a shared resource and has staked his or her prior-
ity claim to the asset. That claim is usually recognized by the
competitors. Calling dibs denies the possibility of simulta-
neous sharing and declares that sharing will be sequential.
A dibs-owned asset can be gifted, traded, or sold, at least
in my childhood household. Rules of right-of-way similarly
manage competition among drivers for the shared space
of the roadway. Raising hands in a classroom similarly
manages competition for shared speaking space. Future re-
search might examine competition phenomena and meth-
ods of managing competition in other consumer contexts
of sharing.
Sharing of immaterial resources does not naturally have
competition because immaterial resources are not confined
by physical space. There is no limit to the number of people
sharing a language, a belief, an experience, and so on. Usage
by one person does not naturally preclude usage by another
person. However, such competition can be artificially or le-
gally imposed. For example, copyright and trademark laws
restrict usage of owned texts and of owned words. Sharing
of digital resources also does not naturally admit of com-
petition. For example, usage of digital music and videos
by one person does not impede usage of the same music
and videos by others. It is indeed possible that the current
interest in consumer sharing is driven in part by the greater
role and easier access that digital resources now have in the
routines of our lives. Future research might more exten-
sively describe the phenomenology of sharing of immaterial
resources and theorize about relationships among users
and between owners and users that such resources impose.
Just as there are extensive research literatures on owner-
ship theory, on child development, and on inventory man-
agement, so too are there several domains of research liter-
atures on competition in contexts of sharing that should be
reviewed and useful aspects of theory introduced to con-
sumer behavior research. One domain is set within biology,
focused on species, or individuals within species, competing
for shared resources of food, territory, mates, and so on. A
full-text search of JSTOR’s biological journals, using the
search expression <(sharing OR shared) AND competition>
found 26,000 articles, and the same search in Google Scholar
found 11,000 articles. For example, Jaeggi and Schaik (2011)
studied food sharing among primates and concluded that
it facilitates coalition building. Gurven (2004) examined re-
ciprocal altruism in food sharing among hunter-gatherers. It
might be noted that Baker and Baker (2016, in this issue)This content downloaded from 209.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms reported that shared narratives of sharing material resources
in a storm-damaged community were a major component in
restoring the coalition of the community.
Another domain of research on competition in contexts
of sharing pertains to economic theories of equilibrium
that optimize allocation of shared resources between com-
petitors. This topic was popularized to some degree by the
depiction of John Nash in the film A Beautiful Mind. A full-
text search of JSTOR using the search expression <(shared
or sharing) and competition and “Nash equilibrium”> found
2,000 articles, and the same search in Google Scholar found
24,000 articles. For example, Madani (2010) demonstrated
that game theory can identify system-wide optimal alloca-
tion of shared water resources. Similarly, Wei et al. (2010)
argued that game theory can identify optimal allocation of
cloud computing resources.
Another domain of research on competition in contexts
of sharing pertains to the unregulated competition for
shared resources leading to destroying those resources.
The seminal presentation of this was Hardin’s (1968) arti-
cle on the “Tragedy of the Commons.” A full-text search of
JSTOR using the search expression <(shared or sharing)
and competition and “tragedy of the commons”> found
2,000 articles, and the same search in Google Scholar found
21,000 articles. For example, Mergesal (1996) argued that
the privatization of science, in the form of patents and in-
tellectual property rights, is destroying what is essentially a
collective project of shared knowledge. Brown and Vincent
(2008) used economic game theory to demonstrate that the
tragedy of the commons can be impeded by decelerating
benefits or accelerating costs.
There probably are other domains of scholarship that
consider competition in contexts of sharing. Future studies
of consumer sharing might include reviews of such litera-
tures in order to identify useful theories, models, and par-
adigms in order to bring more focus on aspects of compe-
tition that might be expected to appear in the sharing
economy.
CONCLUSION
The “sharing economy” is going to be an enduring and ever-
evolving aspect of consumer life. Digital communications
make distributed consumer inventory available on short
notice, and decreasing affluence means that more and more
people will be unable to maintain private ownership of con-
sumer inventory. Scholarship on the sharing economy will
need to develop taxonomies, concepts, theories, models, and83.028.013 on April 08, 2016 13:13:00 PM
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000 The Consumer Science of Sharing Rudminresearch paradigms by which to understand and explain
sharing.
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